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Abstract 
In this paper we use data from industrial plants to investigate if seniority-based pay is used as 
a motivational device for production workers. Alternatively, seniority-based pay could simply 
be a wage setting rule not necessarily related to the provision of incentives. Unlike previous 
papers, we use a direct measure of seniority-based pay as well as measures of monitoring 
devices and piece-rates. We find that firms that offer seniority-based pay are less likely to 
offer explicit incentives. They are also less likely to invest in monitoring devices. We also 
find that firms that offer seniority-based pay are more likely to engage in other human 
resource management policies that result in long employment relationships. Overall these 
results suggest that seniority-based pay is indeed used as a motivation device. 
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1 Introduction
The use of incentive schemes are an important instrument in the hands of firms to motivate
workers. However, not all firms and not all types of production processes require the same
type of incentives to enhance motivation and, therefore, labor productivity.
There are two basic types of incentives that can be provided by firms in order to motivate
workers: explicit and implicit incentives (the latter also referred to as deferred compensation
or delayed payment schemes). Explicit incentives are appropriate when the individual output
is easy to observe and quantify. In that case, the easiest way to provide motivation is to pay
workers a straight piece rate. Implicit incentives are more appropriate when the output is
diﬃcult to observe (or define) at the individual level.
In this paper, we concentrate on implicit incentives. More specifically, we concentrate on
one type of implicit incentives: the seniority-based pay. In general, any deferred compen-
sation scheme implies a contract in which, at some point in the worker’s life-cycle, there is
a discrepancy between the spot wage and the spot value of the worker’s marginal product.
The reason being that workers are paid below their productivity during the first few years of
their contract, while their wage is above their productivity in the final stage of their career
with the firm. If workers do not shirk, they will be allowed to stay with the firm and will
be able to recuperate their initial losses. If they shirk, however, they run the risk of being
caught and dismissed, and therefore of losing the chance to recover the wages owed to them
in the last years of their contract. According to Lazear (1979), workers and firms enter
into these long-term implicit contracts to discourage shirking and malfeasance by shifting
compensation to the end of the contract.
Incentive theories have been diﬃcult to test empirically due to the lack of available data
(see Lazear, 1999). This problem is perhaps even more acute with regard to implicit rather
than explicit incentives.1
In the past, there have been several attempts to test the theory presented in Lazear (1979)
with the available data sets (see, for example, Lazear and Moore, 1984; Hutchens, 1987; or
Barth, 1997, among others).2 Most of these studies tested the predictions of the theory
in terms of worker’s earnings and productivity, the incidence of mandatory retirement or
1A recent test of explicit incentives is provided in Lazear (2000).
2A review of the literature is provided in the next section.
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pensions, or dismissals and tenure. A common characteristic of the existing labor literature
is that it uses survey data at the worker level inferring the existence of a relationship between
wages and seniority. However, to our knowledge, there is not yet a study that has used a
direct measure of the existence of a seniority-based pay policy at the firm level. In this paper,
we test empirically the theory of implicit incentives using a new data set which allows us to
directly observe wether firms decide to set workers’ wages according to seniority or not.3
We use a unique plant level data set that contains information on several firm’s personnel
practices for 734 Spanish industrial establishments. All surveyed establishments are involved
in production processes within the manufacturing sector. Regarding personnel practices, the
survey refers to the blue-collar workers in each plant (that is, workers involved directly in
production). Overall, we obtain very homogenous data for every surveyed plant. At the
same time, a wide scope of diﬀerent firms within the manufacturing sector are included in
the survey.
The main feature of the data set is that it refers to firms rather than individuals and
that it contains a considerable number of firms in the survey. This allows us to measure
the presence of seniority-based pay from a diﬀerent perspective than the one traditionally
used in the empirical literature of tenure and wages which concentrates on worker level data.
Similarly, our data allows us to obtain direct measures of monitoring devices, as well as other
measures of explicit incentives practices. Moreover, the use of plant level data allows us to
get a better understanding of the role that firm and job characteristics play in the diﬀusion
of deferred payment schemes. This is a question that has been scarcely dealt with in the
literature using data at the plant level.
Spain is an interesting case for analyzing seniority-based pay because in this country there
is mandatory retirement for all workers at the age of 65. Therefore, all establishments in our
sample are subject to this mandate. According to Lazear (1979), jobs with delayed payment
contracts should be characterized by mandatory retirement. This institution establishes a
termination date after which the worker is not entitled to continue receiving a wage that is
3Bayo-Moriones and Huerta-Arribas (2002a and 2002b), using the same data set as the one we use here,
have studied explicit incentives. In Bayo-Moriones and Huerta-Arribas (2002a), the authors investigate the
factors that influence the adoption of incentive schemes that link the pay of blue-collar workers to the results
achieved by the establishment that employ them, i.e. the so called organizational incentive plans. And in
Bayo-Moriones and Huerta-Arribas (2002b), they identify the factors that determine the use of production
incentives for manual workers in the Spanish manufacturing industry.
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greater than her productivity. In this context, seniority-based pay can become an optimal
contract.
Using direct data on firm’s personnel practices, we provide empirical support for the
theories that are behind the deferred wage schemes as motivation devices. We find that
firms that oﬀer seniority-based pay are less likely to oﬀer explicit incentives. They are also
less likely to invest in monitoring devices. We also find that firms that oﬀer seniority-based
pay rather than explicit incentives are more likely to engage in other personnel practices that
imply long employment relationships. Finally, since seniority-based pay could be related to
other personnel practices, specially training, we also study if this is the case in our data set.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the related literature.
Section three is devoted to the description of the survey from which we obtained the data
used to perform our exercise. In section four we undertake our empirical analysis. We define
all the variables used in our exercise and proceed to the descriptive analysis of such variables.
The results appear in section five, which is followed by the conclusion.
2 Related Literature
In this section we first review the diﬀerent theories that try to explain the positive correlation
between wages and seniority. We then review the empirical literature that has tested the
theory of seniority-based pay as a motivation device.4
2.1 Explanatory Theories of Seniority-Based Pay
Although there is an agreement regarding the existence of a positive relationship between
seniority and wages, the same cannot be said when the discussion moves to determine the
factors that explain it (see, for example, Hutchens, 1989; or Topel, 1991). Some empirical
papers show that this positive relationship does not necessarily imply that seniority has an
eﬀect on wages (see, for example, Abraham and Farber, 1987; or Altonji and Shakotko, 1987),
since tenure is likely to be related to unobserved individual, job and match characteristics
that aﬀect wages. However other studies, like Topel (1991), find that this heterogeneity is
not so important and that there is a remarkable impact of tenure on wages.
4Two interesting surveys about these issues are Hutchens (1989) and Carmichael (1989).
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Several explanations have been given for the positive eﬀect of seniority on wages. The
most widely recognized and popular is the specific human capital theory (see Becker, 1964;
Mincer, 1974; and Felli and Harris, 1996). Specific human capital generates quasi-rents to
be shared between worker and employer. The sharing takes place through the increase of
wages with tenure, with the main objective of avoiding turnover (see Levine, 1993). Even
though the relationship between wages and seniority is positive, it will not be equal to the
productivity-seniority profile. In order for the human capital investment to take place, the
former will not be as steep as the latter, since the company must reap part of the benefit
from its investment in the worker.
The existing empirical evidence is not unambiguously consistent with the specific human
capital theory. While a part of the literature has found that wage increases due to seniority
have their origin in productivity increases (see, for example, Brown, 1989; and Hellerstein and
Neumark, 1995), other part of the literature provides empirical evidence that cast doubt on
the validity of the predictions of the specific human capital theory (see Medoﬀ and Abraham,
1980; Kotlikoﬀ and Gohkale, 1992; Levine, 1993; Flabbi and Ichino, 2001; among others)
and suggest the need for alternative explanations.
One of these alternative explanations of upward sloping wage profiles is provided by the
models of self-selection (see Salop and Salop, 1976). According to these models, these profiles
will attract only workers who intend to stay with the company throughout their professional
careers. This has a positive impact on the firm due to the reduction in turnover costs.
Deferred payment has also been said to appear because firms may insure risk-averse workers
who are uncertain about their productivity (see Harris and Holmstrom, 1982) or because
workers prefer rising earnings-seniority profiles rather than decreasing or flat profiles (see
Loewenstein and Sicherman, 1991; or Frank and Hutchens, 1993).
An alternative view, and the one that we adopt in this paper, is oﬀered by Lazear
(1979 and 1981), who approaches the problem from the point of view of worker motivation.
Deferred wages schemes can be used to align the interests of the worker with those of the
company. The way in which the wage is distributed over time may have an eﬀect on the gains
generated in the working relationship. By allowing initial wages to be paid at the end of the
employee’s career, the firm discourages the worker from engaging in inappropriate behavior,
and therefore, increases both the value that the employee can be expected to contribute to
the firm and the total amount of wages that this worker receives throughout her career in
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the firm. This would imply a steeper association between wages and seniority than between
productivity and seniority. This is contrary to the claims of the human capital theory which
states that wage growth will always be on a par with or below productivity growth.5
There are several implications to Lazear’s theory. The first implication is that seniority-
based pay becomes unnecessary as a motivational device when workers’ compensation de-
pends directly and positively on the degree of eﬀort they are willing to exert in the job and
on the results they achieve. In other words, firms are more likely to use implicit incentives
when output is more diﬃcult to observe. The second implication is that jobs characterized
by seniority-based pay should have higher wage growth rates than productivity growth rates.
Similarly, pensions (which discourage shirking until the end of job) are more likely in situ-
ations in which implicit incentives are in place. An additional implication of the theory is
that firms with jobs in which implicit incentives are in place should implement mandatory
retirement in order to fix a termination date, after which wages cannot grow beyond the
worker’s productivity. The last implication is that long-tenured workers are more likely to
have jobs that oﬀer mandatory retirement and pensions. In the next section, we review the
empirical literature that has tried to test the theory of implicit incentives.
2.2 Empirical Literature on Implicit Incentives
If linking the wage to seniority is used as a means of motivating workers, it will be applied in
circumstances where there is an agency problem. A situation in which there is no problem
of this sort is when workers are self-employed, that is, when they are the owners of the firm
in which they work. If deferred payment acts as a motivator to workers, the wage-seniority
slopes found in self-owned companies ought to be less pronounced than in other types of
firms. Lazear and Moore (1984) find empirical evidence to support this argument, since the
present value of the lifetime income earned by an employee increases less with the slope of
the age-earnings profile in the case of self-employed workers.
Most existing literature has tested the theory on implicit incentives presented in Lazear
(1979) by focusing on diﬀerent implications of the theory. Some authors have concentrated
5Carmichael (1983), however, reconciles human capital theory with the fact that wage-seniority profile
slopes should be more pronounced than those of the productivity-seniority profile. This author claims that
when a job requires specific training, it may prove to be eﬃcient for a firm to pay its more long-standing
workers a wage that is above their marginal productivity.
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their eﬀorts on the prediction of worker’s wage growth, i.e. wages rise more rapidly than
marginal product. See, for example, Medoﬀ and Abraham (1980), Lazear and Moore (1984),
Spitz (1990) and Lazear (2000). This approach falls directly into the heart of the debate
about causality between tenure and wages mentioned in the previous subsection.
Other authors have studied the implications of the theory on mandatory retirement and
earnings. Examples of which are the original paper by Lazear (1979) and the paper by Clark
and Ogawa (1992) which tests the theory for Japan. Alternative approaches have studied
the implications of the theory for dismissals and tenure (see, for example, Idson and Valetta,
1996).
Finally, some papers have used proxies for seniority-based pay to test the implications of
the theory. An interesting example that relates to our work is Hutchens (1987). In Hutchens
(1987) seniority-based pay is proxied by the degree of monitoring, which in turn is proxied by
how repetitive tasks are in a job. The author then analyzes jobs according to the predicted
characteristics of Lazear’s theory (long tenure, pensions, mandatory retirement, etc.) taking
into account the degree of monitoring.
Another paper that relates to our work is Barth (1997). Working with a sample of
Norwegian workers, the author reports that workers being paid on a piece work basis have
nothing to gain in terms of wage from staying with the same company over a long period
of time. The author arrives to this conclusion by estimating a wage regression (controlling
for worker seniority) and includes a variable that captures the presence of piece rates along
with an interaction term between piece rate and seniority.
A common characteristic of all these papers is that they use survey data at the worker
level inferring the existence of a relationship between wages and seniority from worker’s wage
and tenure data. Our paper, on the other hand, has a direct measure for the existence of
a seniority-based pay policy at the firm level. In addition we also have direct measures of
both monitoring devices and explicit incentives. Finally, we also have information on other
personnel practices that have important implications for the worker’s tenure and thus should
be related to seniority-based payments.
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3 Survey’s Description and Data
In this paper, we use a unique data set that contains plant level information on several
firm’s policies. All surveyed establishments are involved in production processes within the
manufacturing sector. Overall, we obtain very homogenous data for every surveyed plant. At
the same time, a wide scope of diﬀerent firms within the manufacturing sector are included
in the survey. In what follows we describe the characteristics of the survey and concentrate
on the variables that we are going to use in our analysis.
The data was carefully collected in 1998 in the context of a wider research project on
human resource management and operations management in the Spanish manufacturing
industry. All answers in the questionnaire refer to 1997. The concept of manufacturing
industry is clearly defined in the National Classification of Economic Activity (Clasifica-
cion Nacional de Actividades Economicas, CNAE)6 which includes all the manufacturing
industries with the exception of the oil refining industry and the treatment of nuclear fuel.
The manufacturing industry was chosen as the focus of research for several reasons. First,
it is a sector in which heterogeneity is limited when compared, for example, to other sectors
like services. Second, manufacturing is an industry with a very important weight in the
economy of Spain. This allows one to draw more general conclusions applicable to a wider
range of firms. Moreover, within manufacturing companies it is easier to measure variables
such as technology, a key element in the development of the research. Finally, by choosing a
wide scope of activities within the manufacturing sector it allows us to obtain fairly general
conclusions, while avoiding the problems of data sets that are too general and heterogeneous
(see Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003).
In the survey design, it was decided that information should be collected at the plant
level. In the manufacturing sector the plant consists of the business unit, which is of strategic
importance for the implementation of the practices under study. These practices are adopted
in the plant, and therefore, it is at this level that problems arise and where results must be
analyzed. Moreover, the answers to the diﬀerent questions raised are expected to be more
reliable when taken at the plant level, since knowledge of these issues is greater at this level,
even if it is only due to greater proximity.7
6This is equivalent to ISIC rev.3 activity classification.
7As Osterman (1994) states: “The great advantage of surveying establishments, as opposed to firms, is
that the respondent in an establishment is likely to know the facts” (page 174).
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Another aspect of the research scope to be decided was the size of the establishments
to be analyzed. The industrial plants included in our sample employ fifty or more workers.
This limit has been used in other similar studies (see, for instance, Osterman, 1994) and it
serves to cover a wide spectrum of the population employed in Spanish industry. Moreover,
it simplifies the fieldwork, since for this group of firms there are more reliable directories of
the population of firms.
In order to carry out the investigation, a questionnaire was made up jointly by the firm
in charge of the fieldwork and the members of the research group. The preliminary survey
was piloted in nine plants. After the pilot, the survey was modified in several ways to come
up with the final version of the questionnaire. In order to design the questionnaire, the inter-
national literature in relation to the content of the project was examined. The questionnaire
was divided into the following parts: general characteristics of the establishment, technology
and quality management, human resource management, work organization, relations with
customers and suppliers, and information on the firm.
Regarding personnel practices, the survey refers to the blue-collar workers in each plant
(that is, workers involved directly in the production process). The fact that we refer to a
specific group of workers could create problems, as far as the generalization of the results to
other professions is concerned. However, limiting the occupation under study makes com-
parisons easier, since within the company there are possibly several internal labour markets
with substantial diﬀerences between them.
The information was gathered by interviewing the manager of the plant. In most cases
the interview was conducted with either the plant manager or the manager of operations or
human resources in the plant. A personal interview was chosen as the method of collecting
information because it allows a higher response rate.
The reference universe, that is, manufacturing plants with at least 50 workers, was formed
by 6,013 units. The aim was to obtain a sample of one thousand units, stratified according
to sector and size. The larger-size stratum was represented at 50 per cent in the sample
design. For the two remaining size strata, a fixed number of 30 interviews was allocated
to each sector; the rest of the interviews being allocated proportionally across sectors. The
sample allocated to each of the strata within a sector was also distributed proportionally. A
random selection of plants was taken from each stratum for interview. After making 3,246
telephone calls to make the necessary appointments, 965 valid interviews were conducted.
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For the purpose of this paper we analyze a final sample of 734 plants, such that none of the
variables have missing values. For this type of data, this is a considerably large sample size.
4 Empirical Analysis
In order to understand if seniority-based pay is used as a motivation device rather than
as a simple rule for setting wages, we will proceed as follows. We will first analyze the
relationship between seniority-based pay, monitoring devices and explicit incentives. In the
presence of an agency problem, the firm can adopt diﬀerent solutions to increase its output.
In the event that monitoring worker’s eﬀort is diﬃcult and costly, the firm is more likely
to implement implicit incentive devices (such as seniority-based pay). According to this, we
expect to find seniority-based pay and monitoring devices to be substitutes. If, however,
monitoring worker’s eﬀort is easy, the firm can induce output using monitoring devices as
well as allowing explicit incentives, such as piece rates. Therefore we also expect to find
seniority-based pay and explicit incentives to be substitutes.
Once it is established that seniority-based pay is used as a motivation device, in a second
step we analyze other practices that are potentially important for the firm when deciding to
choose seniority-based pay to motivate its workers. We consider other personnel practices
that favour long term employment relationships. These practices make the firm’s commit-
ment to pay high future wages credible and therefore are complementary measures to implicit
incentives. They provide further evidence that seniority-based pay is used as an incentive
device.
As mentioned earlier, wages can be correlated with worker’s tenure for reasons other than
those related to incentives. The most obvious alternative that we consider is the existence
of training. In a third step we will analyze the relationship between seniority-based pay and
training policies.
Diﬀerent personnel practices are usually chosen simultaneously by a firm, generating
“systems” or “bundles” of practices. There are theoretical foundations that explain the
complementarities of diﬀerent policies (see for example, Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994).
We are aware of the possible endogeneity problems of including diﬀerent personnel practices
as independent regressors when estimating the probability that firms use seniority-based pay
schemes. However, in the present context, and precisely due to this multidimensional nature
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of the firm’s practices, it is very diﬃcult to find instruments. Therefore, we will carefully
interpret our results as bivariate relationships between diﬀerent personnel practices.
In the next two subsections we describe the variables used in our exercise and perform a
descriptive analysis of those variables.
4.1 Variables
In this section, we define the variables used in our empirical analysis. Table 1 defines each
variable and provides their basic summary statistics.
The survey contains information on the two most important factors that are accounted
for when setting the fixed-part of wages for blue-collar workers. The survey makes a clear
distinction between the part of the worker’s remuneration that is fixed and the part of the
worker’s remuneration that is variable. There are five possible factors that can determine the
fixed-part of wages. These include seniority, worker characteristics (skills, eﬀectivity, evalu-
ation from a supervisor) and job characteristics. Using the information gathered from the
survey, we construct two variables SENIORITY PAY 1 and SENIORITY PAY 2. These
will be the main dependent variables in our exercises. SENIORITY PAY 1 takes value one
if wages are set according to seniority (i.e. if seniority is recorded as the most important or
the second most important factor in determining wages) and zero otherwise. We have also
constructed SENIORITY PAY 2 that takes value two when seniority is said to be the most
important factor for setting wages, value one when it was mentioned as the second most
important factor, and value zero in the remaining cases. These variables directly capture the
idea of deferred wages. We find that a substantial fraction of firms follow this policy: around
30 per cent of firms pay according to seniority. Among these, 30 per cent say that seniority
is the most important criteria used when setting wages, while for the remaining 70 per cent
it is the second most important criteria. This figures are empirically relevant to conduct our
exercise.8
In the survey firms are asked if they oﬀer incentives to their blue-collar workers. These
include incentives that are based on productivity, quality, plant-level or firm’s results. The
8We have not been able to find any other paper that studies this variable with a cross section of firms,
so we can not establish any comparison.
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incentives correspond to the explicit incentives referred to earlier. Using this information,
we construct the variable EXPINCENTIV ES that takes value one if firms answer aﬃr-
matively to this question and zero otherwise. As table 1 shows, around 62 percent of firms
oﬀer some explicit incentives to their workers.
The survey also contains information on the degree of supervision and control under
which manual workers perform their duties at the plant. The answers are in a scale of one
to five, where one is equivalent to “no supervision” at all, and five is equivalent to “very
supervised”. Using this information we construct the variableMONITORING which takes
value one if the degree of control is suﬃciently high (i.e. values four and five as the answers
to this question) and zero otherwise. In our sample, around 40 per cent of firms spend
resources in supervising their workers according to this variable.
We now turn to looking at factors other than incentives that can be behind the deter-
mination of seniority-based pay schemes. In our empirical analysis, it is important that we
control for these factors.
• Sector
In our data set we have information on the sector to which the plant’s activity belongs (at
a three digit level). The sector indicators capture the nature of the production technology.
This is crucial in determining the ease to monitor eﬀort (see Hutchens, 1987). According
to the information available, we can distinguish among 91 diﬀerent sectors. Since it is
very important that we analyze the provision of incentives among plants that have similar
diﬃculties in observing eﬀort, we will include sectorial dummies in all of our regressions.
• Region
The province in which the plants are located also appears in our data set. There are 50
diﬀerent provinces within Spain which correspond to 17 diﬀerent Autonomous Communi-
ties. Although the labor legislation is exactly the same in all regions, part of the collective
negotiation between unions and employers’ representatives is done at the provincial level.
Therefore, it may still be important to control for possible province eﬀects, given the exis-
tence of potential diﬀerences in the negotiation of some labor conditions between unions and
employers.
• Age of the establishment
In the data set we also have information regarding the year in which the establishment
was founded. We construct the variable OLD that takes value one if the establishment was
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founded before 1980 and zero otherwise. The year 1980 is particularly relevant in Spain
since it is the year in which the Worker’s Statute, the main law that regulates the diﬀerent
aspects of labor relations in the Spanish democratic era, was signed.
• Ownership
Diﬀerent sources of information regarding the ownership structure of the firms are avail-
able in the data set. From this information, we construct the following variables. We define
the variable STATESHARE that takes value one if the state owns a share of the firm and
zero otherwise. Around three percent of firms in our sample have some of their shares owned
by the state. Among these, on average, 65 per cent of their capital is state owned. More-
over, since the establishments respond if they belong (totally or partially) to a multinational
group, we can define the variable MULTINATIONAL that takes value one if the firm
belongs to a multinational group and zero otherwise.
• Size
The size of the establishment is also available since the data set provides information
regarding the number of workers employed at each establishment. We construct the variable
LARGE that takes value one if the firm has more than 500 workers and zero otherwise.
• Union
The presence and influence of unions in the firm can also be obtained from the available
information. In Spain, most large firms negotiate an agreement beyond the regional one that
applies solely to that firm. All workers, unionized or not, are subject to this agreement. A
unionized worker has the right to enter in this negotiation process, since unionized workers
have the right to vote among them their representatives in the negotiation with the firm.
The number of unionized workers at the firm can play an important role in determining the
type of agreement reached since this number also gives an idea of the strength of unions
in the firm (see, for instance, Diaz-Moreno and Galdon-Sanchez, 2004). We construct the
variable UNION that takes value one if the level of workers’ unionization is higher than 60
per cent and zero otherwise.
• Wage Level
Firms are asked to compare the wages paid to their workers with the wages of similar
workers in similar firms and in the same region. We construct the variable WABOV E that
takes value one if firms say that the wages of their workers are above the wages of comparable
workers and zero otherwise.
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• Foreign Product Markets
The dataset has information regarding the distribution of firms’ sales in Spain, Europe
and the rest of the world. From this information, we construct the variable INTSALES that
takes value one if more than 50 per cent of the firm’s sales are international and zero other-
wise.
Once we establish that seniority-based pay is used as a motivation device, and in order
to provide further evidence, we analyze diﬀerent factors and personnel policies that could be
more relevant to the use of seniority-based pay than to the use of explicit incentives. These
are described below.
• Temporary (or Fixed-Term) Contracts9
The proportion of workers under fixed-term and permanent contracts is also available in
the data set. This ranges from zero to 96 per cent. We construct the variable TC1 that
takes value one if there is a positive amount of workers under temporary contracts in the
establishment, and value zero if there are only workers under permanent contracts. We also
define the variable TC2 which takes value 1 if at least 20 per cent of the workers at the plant
are under a fixed-term contract and zero otherwise.
• Firing policies
There is information regarding firing policies from those firms that have recently fired
workers or that were in the process of adjusting their work force at the time. The number
of observations for these variables is reduced substantially since many firms in the sample
were not in a process of workforce adjustment. In particular, firms were asked about the
adoption of alternative policies to avoid firing workers under permanent contracts. We use
the information provided for the firms that were involved in this process to define three
variables. The first is NOFIRE which takes value one if the firm found ways other than
firing to adjust its work force and zero otherwise. If firms try to avoid firing workers, the
alternative ways of adjustment include reducing the outsourcing production in other firms,
relocating workers into other tasks, reducing additional hours of all workers, or reducing the
normal hours of work of the aﬀected workers. The second is EARLY RET that takes value
9In 1984 there was a reform of the Spanish Labor Law that allowed the use of fixed-term contracts for
jobs whose nature was not necessarily temporary. These contracts imply much lower termination costs than
permanent contracts (see, for instance, Güell, 2000; and Alonso-Borrego et al., 2004, for an analysis of their
eﬀect in the Spanish economy).
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one if the firm oﬀered early retirement to the older workers in the establishment and zero
otherwise. The third is FIRETC that takes value one if the firm fires temporary workers
first in order to avoid firing permanent workers.
• Training
As we have previously mentioned, wages can be correlated with worker’s tenure for reasons
other than incentives. A prominent alternative to this explanation is the existence of training.
We have information on whether blue-collar workers were oﬀered training courses. From this
information we construct the variable TRAINING. This variable takes value one if training
was oﬀered by the establishment to blue-collar workers and zero otherwise.
4.2 Descriptive Analysis
The descriptive analysis of the variables used in our exercise can be found in table 2. This
analysis is based on the variable SENIORITY PAY 2. The left hand panel of this table
displays the summary statistics for the main variables used by firms that set their wages
according to seniority, while the central panel displays the summary statistics for the main
variables used by firms where seniority is never used as a criteria to set wages. The right
hand panel displays the p-values associated with the one-sided tests regarding the diﬀerence
in variable means for firms that pay according to seniority and those that do not.
The first important feature to note is that the firms that provide seniority-based pay are
less likely to provide explicit incentives than those that do not provide such wage scheme.
They also tend to undertake less monitoring in terms of our measure (MONITORING),
although the diﬀerence is not significant. These factors provide some preliminary evidence
that seniority-based pay and other incentive mechanisms can be considered substitutive
devices. It is also worth noting that these firms tend to be older, partly or totally owned
by the state, and larger. Firms that oﬀer wages according to seniority tend to be more
unionized, although the diﬀerence is not significant. Since the firm’s characteristics could
aﬀect the way in which the firm sets its wages, it is important to control for these factors in
our regression analysis. For example, stated owned and/or large firms may have a preference
for rules rather than discretion with regard to their pay schemes. Therefore it is important
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to see if the negative relationship between seniority-based pay and explicit incentives, that
appears in the data, holds once these variables are included as controls in our analysis.
With regard to other personnel policies, firms that provide seniority-based wages have
also a lower proportion of workers under fixed-term contracts. More often they oﬀer the
option of early retirement to their workers and, in general, they try to look for alternative
ways to adjust their work force rather than firing workers. Regarding training and seniority-
based pay, table 2 shows that there is no diﬀerence in terms of training between firms that
oﬀer seniority-based pay and those that do not.
5 Results
In this section we undertake the empirical analysis and explain the results obtained. We
want to investigate if the propensity of a firm to oﬀer delayed payments is related to long-
term incentives. That is, to see if the negative correlation between seniority-based pay and
other incentive devices (explicit incentives or monitoring devices) remains after controlling
for diﬀerent firm characteristics as well as regional and sectorial controls. In particular,
we estimate probit models in which SENIORITY PAY 2 is the dependent variable and
then ordered probit models in which SENIORITY PAY 1 is the dependent variable.10 The
results are displayed in tables 3a and 3b, respectively.
We start with the most simple specification which includes EXPINCENTIV ES as an
explanatory variable as well as the mentioned controls. As column (1) of table 3a indicates,
firms that oﬀer seniority-based pay are less likely to oﬀer explicit incentives, even after con-
trolling for diﬀerent firm characteristics. This result confirms the findings of Barth (1997).
Working with a sample of Norwegian workers, he finds that piece-rate workers have a neg-
ligible return to seniority in terms of wages. Column (2) analyzes the relationship between
seniority-based pay and monitoring. Again, a negative relationship remains after controlling
for firm characteristics. This result is similar to the findings of Hutchens (1987). Using
US data, he shows that monitoring diﬃculties correlate positively with the application of
deferred payment schemes.
10Around 10 per cent of the observations in the sample display no variation withing sectoral and regional
dummies and are lost in the estimation.
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Jobs that oﬀer piece rate payments are conducive to monitoring (see Lazear, 1979).
As Hutchens (1987) clearly explains, in this case, monitoring essentially takes the form of
counting the units produced and then workers are paid accordingly. In column (3), we allow
both EXPINCENTIV ES and MONITORING as right-hand side variables. Moreover,
we allow an interaction term between these two variables. The negative coeﬃcient on these
two variables remains in this specification. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term is not
statistically diﬀerent from zero, suggesting that there is no additional eﬀect from firms that
invest in monitoring devices while provide incentives.
The variable OLD is significant in all specifications. That is, older firms are more likely
to use seniority-based pay. This result is in line with the idea that the use of seniority-based
pay is a more traditional way of providing incentives.
Table 3b reports the results when repeating the previous exercise using the variable
SENIORITY PAY 1 as dependent variable. Overall the same results are found. All these
results suggest that seniority-based pay and explicit incentives, as well as monitoring devices,
act as substitutes. This implies that seniority-based pay is used as a motivation device and
it is the main prediction of Lazear’s theory. The intuition is simple: the more diﬃcult a job
is to supervise and the less resources devoted by the firm to the control of workers, the more
likely it is that the firm relies on deferred payment.
As mentioned earlier, diﬀerent personnel practices are chosen simultaneously by a firm.
One possible way of solving this simultaneity problem is to estimate multivariate pro-
bits of the diﬀerent incentive practices. In this case, the correlation coeﬃcient between
the diﬀerent equations captures the relationship between the diﬀerent practices. We es-
timate bivariate probit models in which SENIORITY PAY 2 and EXPINCENTIV ES,
and SENIORITY PAY 2 and MONITORING, respectively, are the dependent variables
(columns (1) and (2) in table 4). We also estimate a trivariate probit model in which
SENIORITY PAY 2, EXPINCENTIV ES andMONITORING are the dependent vari-
ables (column (3) in table 4).11 As can be seen, the correlation coeﬃcients between the
variables SENIORITY PAY 2 and EXPINCENTIV ES, and SENIORITY PAY 2 and
MONITORING are negative and significant, providing further evidence that these are sub-
stitutive practices. The correlation coeﬃcient between the variables EXPINCENTIV ES
and MONITORING is positive but not significant.
11For estimation of this type of models see, for instance, Cappelari and Jenkins (2003).
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Once we have established that seniority-based pay is a substitute for other motivation
devices, we analyze further the relationship between this policy and other personnel prac-
tices. Economic theory suggests that firms that decide to use seniority-based pay as an
incentive device, rather than using explicit incentives, should complement the policy with
other personnel practices that give the firm the necessary credibility to commit to future
wages. As Hutchens (1987) states, delayed payment schemes should be accompanied by long
job tenure. However, this should not be the case for firms that oﬀer explicit incentives.
Table 5a displays the estimates of trivariate probit models in which SENIORITY PAY 2,
EXPINCENTIV ES and MONITORING are the dependent variables. In these regres-
sions, diﬀerent personnel practices are included. In particular, the use of short duration
contracts is analyzed. The left-hand panel in table 5a displays the results for the variable
TC1 and the right-hand panel displays the results for the variable TC2.
Overall, the regressions displayed in table 5a show that firms that opt for deferred incen-
tives are less likely to use short duration contracts.12 This result indicates a commitment to
long employment relations that can be rationalized in terms of the incentive role of seniority-
based pay practices. Instead, as expected, the coeﬃcients of TC1 and TC2 are not in general
significant for the equations in which the dependent variables are EXPINCENTIV ES or
MONITORING. The correlation coeﬃcients between these variables are similar, although
smaller, to those reported in table 4.
We next analyze diﬀerent firing policies. As mentioned, these variables have fewer ob-
servations because only the firms that have been recently under a process of restructuring
have to answer the questions related to firing policies. For this reason, we are forced to esti-
mate separate probit models (rather than a trivariate probit) in which SENIORITY PAY 2,
EXPINCENTIV ES and MONITORING are the dependent variables.13 Table 5b dis-
plays these estimates.
12Ordered probit estimates in which SENIORITY PAY 1 is the depedent variable provide similar results
(available upon request).
13In these estimations, to maximize the number of observations, regional dummies correspond to the 17
Autonomous Communities instead of the 50 provinces.
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The left-hand panel of table 5b analyzes the NOFIRE variable. Firms that oﬀer
seniority-based pay are less likely to fire workers and more likely to find other solutions
to avoid dismissal. However, when EXPINCENTIV ES and MONITORING are the
dependent variables, the coeﬃcient of this variable is not significant. The middle-panel of
table 5b analyzes the EARLY RET variable. Firms that oﬀer seniority-based pay tend to
oﬀer early retirement more often, although the coeﬃcient is not significant. The coeﬃcient is
not significant either for the other two regressions. Finally, the right-hand panel of table 5b
analyzes the FIRETC variable. Firms that oﬀer seniority-based pay also tend to fire their
temporary workers more frequently than their permanent workers, although the coeﬃcient
is again not significant. For the other two regressions, the coeﬃcient is not significant either.
Overall these results suggest that firms that choose seniority-based pay also choose other
personnel practices that imply long employment relationships, which is consistent with the
idea that seniority-based pay is used to provide long-term incentives.
As mentioned before, there are alternative theories that predict a positive relationship
between wages and seniority for reasons other than the provision of incentives. In particular,
this could be the case in the presence of training policies. In what follows we estimate
a probit model in which the dependent variable is SENIORITY PAY 2 (and an ordered
probit in which the dependent variable is SENIORITY PAY 1). In this model, we include
the variable TRAINING as an explanatory variable. Table 6 displays the results of this
exercise.
The main result in this table is that training and seniority-based pay are negatively
related. The coeﬃcient is not statistically diﬀerent from zero in the case of the probit
model, but it is significant when using an ordered probit. This result suggests that firms
that oﬀer seniority-based pay are not more likely to train their workers than firms that do not
pay according to accumulated tenure. Several caveats are worth noting. First, the variable
TRAINING is a general measure of training and not necessarily training on firm-specific
skills. Second, this variable captures training activities from the previous year and not overall
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training activities nor training required in the current job.14
Of course, our findings do not rule out training as a mechanism that generates a positive
correlation between wages and seniority or that trained workers receive higher wages through
their tenure. From our sample, however, it does suggest (keeping these caveats in mind) that
there are reasons beyond training that explain the practice seniority-based pay. In this paper,
we have argued that there is evidence that seniority-based pay is used as an incentive device.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have empirically tested the theory of long term implicit contracts using plant
level data. In particular, we have analyzed the possible motivation role of seniority-based
pay schemes. Unlike previous papers, we have used a direct measure of such firm practice.
Our main result is that firms that oﬀer seniority-based pay are less likely to oﬀer explicit
incentives in the form of piece-rates. They are also less likely to invest in monitoring devices.
This result holds after controlling for several firm characteristics. Another interesting result
arising from our exercise is that firms that oﬀer seniority-based pay are likely to engage in
other personnel practices that imply long employment relationships. These practices make
the firm’s commitment to pay high future wages credible and therefore are complementary
measures to implicit incentives. Overall, our plant level data provide empirical support to
the implicit incentives theory proposed by Lazear (1979).
We think that in order to properly test personnel economics theories, plant level data
on firm’s practices is required. The data is costly to gather and has so far been scarce,
but it contains valuable information that can shed new light on testing personnel economic
theories.
14Barth (1997) has information on the job’s required level of on-the-job training. He finds that firm-specific
training has a negative eﬀect on the tenure wage profile.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev.
SENIORITY PAY1 0.372   (0.636)
second, 0 = otherwise
SENIORITY PAY2 1 = wages set according to seniority, 0 = otherwise 0.287   (0.452)
EXPINCENTIVES 1 = explicit incentives provided, 0 = otherwise 0.619   (0.485)
MONITORING 1 = workers subject to high supervision, 0 = otherwise 0.396   (0.488)
OLD 1 = plant founded before 1980, 0 = otherwise 0.738   (0.439)
STATESHARE 1 = state owns a share of the firm, 0 = otherwise 0.034   (0.181)
MULTINATIONAL 1 = firm belongs to multinational group, 0 = otherwise 0.287   (0.452)
LARGE 1 = firm with more than 500 workers, 0 = otherwise 0.107   (0.309)
UNION 1 = unionization of workers above 60 %, 0 = otherwise 0.318   (0.467)
WABOVE 1 = wages above similar workers in similar sector and 0.419   (0.493)
region, 0 = otherwise
INTSALES 1 = more than 50 % of sales sold abroad, 0.241   (0.428)
0 = otherwise
TRAINING 1 = training provided, 0 = otherwise 0.792   (0.406)
TC1 1 = share of temporary workers >0, 0 = otherwise 0.857   (0.348)
TC2 1 = share of temporary workers >20%, 0 = otherwise 0.385   (0.487)
EARLYRET* 1 = early retirement offered under workforce reduction 0.685   (0.465)
process, 0 = otherwise
FIRETC* 1 = fire temporary workers under workforce reduction 0.488   (0.500)
process, 0 = otherwise
NOFIRE* 1 = find alternative measures to dismissal under 0.657   (0.474)
workforce reduction process, 0 = otherwise
Number of obs. 
* For these variables, the number of observations is 178.
Definition
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
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2 = seniority mentioned first, 1 = seniority mentioned
 
 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p-value
EXPINCENTIVES 0.578 (0.495) 0.636 (0.481) 0.069
MONITORING 0.364 (0.482) 0.409 (0.492) 0.134
OLD 0.819 (0.385) 0.705 (0.456) 0.000
STATESHARE 0.061 (0.241) 0.022 (0.149) 0.004
MULTINATIONAL 0.289 (0.454) 0.284 (0.451) 0.454
LARGE 0.156 (0.364) 0.087 (0.283) 0.003
UNION 0.327 (0.470) 0.315 (0.465) 0.381
WABOVE 0.426 (0.495) 0.416 (0.493) 0.404
INTSALES 0.218 (0.413) 0.250 (0.433) 0.176
TRAINING 0.767 (0.423) 0.801 (0.399) 0.157
TC1 0.796 (0.403) 0.883 (0.321) 0.001
TC2 0.289 (0.454) 0.424 (0.494) 0.000
EARLYRET 3 0.768 (0.425) 0.633 (0.484) 0.029
FIRETC 3 0.507 (0.503) 0.477 (0.501) 0.470
NOFIRE 3 0.594 (0.494) 0.697 (0.461) 0.092
Number of obs. 
1SENORITYPAY2 = 1.
2SENORITYPAY2 = 0.
3For these variables, the number of observations is 69 for Seniority-Based Pay and 109 for Non
Seniority-Based Pay.
Seniority-Based Pay1 Non Seniority-Based Pay 2
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, by Seniority Based Pay
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Variable (1) (2) (3)
EXPINCENTIVES -0.296 -0.412
(0.127) (0.162)
MONITORING -0.269 -0.465
(0.124) (0.208)
EXPINCETIVES  X MONITORING 0.318
(0.259)
OLD  0.479 0.454  0.482
(0.145) (0.144) (0.146)
STATESHARE  0.242 0.255  0.155
(0.359) (0.357) (0.365)
MULTINATIONAL -0.085 -0.097 -0.109
(0.148) (0.149) (0.150)
LARGE  0.116 0.074  0.110
(0.211) (0.211) (0.212)
UNION  0.076 0.078  0.095
(0.134) (0.134) (0.135)
WABOVE -0.062 -0.078 -0.051
(0.124) (0.125) (0.125)
INTSALES -0.039 -0.023 -0.009
(0.158) (0.158) (0.160)
Constant -0.924 -0.914 -0.669
(0.541) (0.544) (0.556)
SECTOR DUMMIES Y Y Y
REGION DUMMIES Y Y Y
Log Likelihood  -347.895 -348.249  -344.934
Chi-squared 112.80   112.10 118.73
Number of obs. 654 654 654
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis
Probit Estimates
Table 3a. Seniority-Based Pay and Explicit Incentives.
 
Variable (1) (2) (3)
EXPINCENTIVES -0.236 -0.339
(0.117) (0.149)
MONITORING -0.276 -0.451
(0.116) (0.191)
EXPINCETIVES  X MONITORING 0.283
(0.239)
OLD  0.400   0.385  0.407
(0.137) (0.136) (0.137)
STATESHARE  0.109 0.122 0.032
(0.308) (0.307) (0.312)
MULTINATIONAL -0.082  -0.092 -0.100
(0.137) (0.138) (0.138)
LARGE  0.079 0.042 0.062
(0.192) (0.193) (0.193)
UNION  0.105   0.109  0.120
(0.122) (0.122) (0.123)
WABOVE -0.026 -0.036 -0.014
(0.116) (0.116) (0.117)
INTSALES -0.007   0.003  0.018
(0.149) (0.149) (0.150)
Ancillary parameter 1 0.670 0.614 0.425
(0.497) (0.500) (0.509)
Ancillary parameter 2 1.630 1.579 1.394
(0.499) (0.502) (0.510)
SECTOR DUMMIES Y Y Y
REGION DUMMIES Y Y Y
Log Likelihood  -487.727 -486.886 -484.264
Chi-squared 160.69 162.37  167.62
Number of obs. 663 663 663
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis
Ordered Probit Estimates
Table 3b. Seniority-Based Pay and Explicit Incentives.
 
(1) (2)
SENIORITY PAY2 SENIORITY PAY2 SENIORITY PAY2 MONITORING
EXPINCENTIVES -0.197 -0.193  0.089
(0.074) (0.074) (0.073)
MONITORING -0.168 -0.158
(0.073) (0.074)
CONTROLS2 Y Y
Log Likelihood -729.913  -759.300
Chi-squared 196.03 190.25
Number of obs. 734 734
1Simulated maximum-likelihood estimates using GHK smooth recursive simulator (100 random draws).
2As in Table 3a.
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis
-1138.631
291.32
734
Table 4. Multivariate Probit Estimates. Correlation Coefficients
(3)1
Y
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
TC1 -0.422 0.203 0.333
(0.173) (0.174) (0.168)
TC2 -0.372 0.223 0.178
(0.136) (0.128) -0.124
CONTROLS3
Rho12
Rho13
Rho23
Log Likelihood
Chi-squared
Number of obs. 
1 Simulated maximum-likelihood estimates using GHK smooth recursive simulator (100 random draws).
2 The dependent variables are: (1) = SENIORITYPAY2; (2) = EXPINCENTIVES ; (3) = MONITORING.
3 As in Table 3a.
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis
734 734
-1133.683 -1133.065
297.76 298.32
0.083 0.085
(0.073) (0.073)
-0.147 -0.153
(0.074) (0.074)
-0.183 -0.182
(0.075) (0.075)
Table 5a. Incentives and Other Personnel Practices. Trivariate Probit Estimates1
Dependent variables2
Y Y
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
NOFIRE -1.140 0.076 0.626
(0.552) (0.482) (0.375)
EARLYRET 0.532 -0.004 -0.183
(0.516) (0.490) (0.384)
FIRETC 1.042 -0.502 -0.453
(0.586) (0.493) (0.386)
CONTROLS2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Log Likelihood -43.116 -42.863 -64.861 -44.998 -42.875 -66.203 -43.739 -42.355 -65.61
Chi-squared 64.38 49.76 32.58 60.61  49.74 29.89 63.13 50.78 31.08
Number of obs. 111 98 120 111 98 120 111 98 120
1 The dependent variables are: (1) = SENIORITYPAY2; (2) = EXPINCENTIVES ; (3) = MONITORING.
2 As in Table 3a.
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis
Table 5b. Incentives and Other Personnel Practices. Probit Estimates
Dependent variables1
 
Probit Ordered Probit
Variable (1) (2)
TRAINING -0.262  -0.304
(0.157) (0.146)
OLD  0.447  0.374
(0.144) (0.136)
STATESHARE  0.322  0.190
(0.356) (0.307)
MULTINATIONAL -0.068 -0.060
(0.149) (0.138)
LARGE  0.110  0.090
(0.210) (0.192)
UNION 0.082  0.115
(0.134) (0.122)
WABOVE -0.07 -0.027
(0.124) (0.116)
INTSALES -0.034 -0.004
(0.158) (0.148)
Constant -0.958
(0.539)
Ancillary parameter 1 0.615
(0.499)
Ancillary parameter 2 1.578
(0.501)
SECTOR DUMMIES Y Y
REGION DUMMIES Y Y
Log Likelihood -349.221 -487.584
Chi-squared 110.15 160.98
Number of obs. 654 663
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis
Table 6. Seniority-Based Pay and Training
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